This Article reports on an empirical study of one hundred and twenty empirical legal studies published in leading, non-peer-reviewed 
INTRODUCTION
In their landmark attack on law review empiricism, 1 social science empiricists Lee Epstein and Gary King claimed to have found that every one of the 231 empirical studies they reviewed violated social science "rules of inference."
2 They concluded that "the current state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed" 3 and proposed reforms designed to make law review empiricism more like social science empiricism. 4 They did not, however, explain their methodology sufficiently to support replication 5 or include a control group of social science empiricism. The latter prevented them from This Article is the last of three in which I report on a series of empirical studies of the relationship between law schools and Ph.D.-granting disciplines. Based in part on the findings in the study reported here, I argued in Disciplining Legal Scholarship 10 that the hiring of large numbers of social scientists on law faculties-principally economists and political scientistsis impeding the empirical study of legal practice. Social scientists employ their own disciplines' methods to study their own disciplines' traditional data sources and answer their own disciplines' questions. As a result, they largely replicate the work in their own disciplines while leaving legal practice relatively unstudied. By imposing their disciplines' rules on nondisciplinary legal empiricists-through tenure, hiring, and peer review-social scientists on law faculties discourage the nondisciplinary study of legal practice.
In the second article, Dawn of the Discipline-Based Law Faculty, 11 I presented empirical evidence on the massive shift in law school hiring practices that is fundamentally changing the nature of legal education. 12 Law schools, at all levels of the hierarchy, are rapidly increasing the rate at which 6. I have adopted this terminology for convenience. Whether law is a discipline is a matter of some dispute. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 324 (2012) ("Law, however, is regarded not as a discipline in its own right with something of its own to contribute to the interdisciplinary enterprise, but merely as a context for projects from other disciplines."). That dispute is beyond the scope of this Article. they are hiring Ph.D.s. The J.D.-Ph.D.s being hired by top-twenty-six law faculties have sharply lower levels of experience in the practice of law than the non-Ph.D.s being hired by those faculties. 13 The study reported in this Article explored the effects of disciplinary training on the types of empirical legal scholarship produced. The study revealed four categories of differences associated with the presence and concentrations of Ph.D.s among the authors of an empirical study. First, although Ph.D.s collaborate more than faculty holding only law degrees ("J 14 That preference is important because it is in conflict with the principal justification for law school Ph.D. and J.D.-Ph.D. hiring. The justification is that hiring even small proportions of Ph.D.s will generate large proportions of empiricism, because the Ph.D.s will collaborate with J.D.-only professors to enable the latter to produce empiricism. 15 Because of the preference, however, massive Ph.D. hiring is actually producing only moderate increases in legal empiricism. 16 Because Ph.D.s and J.D.-Ph.D.s have greater methodological expertise and J.D.s have greater legal expertise, the Ph.D.s' choice of collaborators also suggests that the Ph.D.s see more need for additional methodological expertise than for legal expertise. This observation supports the argument I made in Disciplining Legal Scholarship that disciplinary legal empiricism is undergoing a competitive and unproductive escalation of its methodological sophistication. 17 Second, nearly two-thirds of the empirical studies I examined had at least one author who held a Ph.D. 18 The proportion was much higher in the peer-reviewed JELS (85%) than in the law reviews (55%). It appears that the standard for acceptance of legal empiricism at JELS makes Ph.D. training almost a necessity. It also appears that standard does not value legal training as highly. Thirty-five percent of the JELS articles had no author who held a With the expansion of empiricism and formal modeling in these journals, coauthorship has risen substantially.").
18. See infra tbl.9.
law degree. From those two findings, I conclude that the peer-reviewed journals that many disciplinary legal empiricists would substitute for the law reviews 19 would also tend to value methodological sophistication over legal expertise.
Third, Ph.D. empiricism differs from J.D. empiricism in the sources from which the scholars obtain their data. 20 J.D. empiricists tend to draw from published sources-principally court opinions on Lexis and Westlaw. Ph.D. empiricists are more likely to obtain their data from prior research, survey, or experiment. The experiments Ph.D.s conducted were often more relevant to the Ph.D.s' home disciplines than to law. Thus, in conducting their research, the J.D.-only empiricists tended to read cases, while the Ph.D. empiricists analyzed existing data and worked with research subjects. Again, the J.D.-only empiricists reinforce their legal knowledge, while the Ph.D.s reinforce their methodological expertise.
Fourth, Ph.D.s were only about half as likely as J.D.-only professors to create new datasets. 21 "Coding" is the process by which researchers create datasets. The researchers categorize empirical observations and usually convert them into numbers for statistical analysis. When Ph.D.s coded, they were more likely than J.D.-only professors to code nonlegal materials. Coding legal materials is an important activity because it requires engagement with the materials. That engagement provides the scholar with valuable context and may lead to discoveries. In addition, the scholar becomes an expert on the subject of the materials, thus positioning the scholar for future research.
Scholars who analyze preexisting data become experts on the protocols that governed collection of the data. But they rarely personally read and analyze the data source and so are unlikely to become experts on the content of the data source. For example, scholars who download and analyze data extracted by others from Supreme Court opinions may have no occasion to actually read Supreme Court opinions.
Ph.D.-only scholars cannot practice law and, therefore, have no legal practice experience. Most J.D.-Ph.D.s have no legal practice either. 22 As a result, Ph.D. holders are unlikely to know or understand much of the legal system's institutional detail at the time of their hiring. That initial lack of knowledge and understanding is exacerbated by the disciplinary legal empiricists' reluctance to engage with legal materials. Thus, disciplinary legal empiricists are less likely than nondisciplinary legal empiricists to develop legal 19 . See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 127 (advocating an alternative model of scholarly journal management in which "law schools would expand editorial boards to include faculty members" and every article would be peer reviewed by faculty members).
20. Part I explains why the nature of disciplinary legal empiricism matters. In essence, it matters because the nature of disciplinary legal empiricists' work determines whether they can be full and effective participants in preparing students for the practice of law. If they cannot, competitive pressures will force law schools to reduce the size of the tenure-track faculty and to shift the task of preparing students for the practice of law to the growing fulltime, non-tenure-track faculty.
Part II describes the methods employed in this study. Part III presents my empirical findings and analyses. Part IV concludes that important differences exist between disciplinary and nondisciplinary legal empiricism. As Ph.D.s and J.D.-Ph.D.s continue to replace J.D.-only professors on law faculties, the ratio of disciplinary to nondisciplinary legal empiricism will increase. As a result, the tenure-track faculty will be further removed from the realities of law and legal practice.
I. WHY THE NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY LEGAL EMPIRICISM MATTERS
The nature of disciplinary legal empiricism is important because law schools are rapidly hiring disciplinary legal empiricists. Not surprisingly, the scholars hired tend to focus on the subjects and apply the theories and methods of their home disciplines. To the extent those scholars focus on subjects other than legal practice, they may reduce the faculty's aggregate knowledge of legal practice, reduce its ability to teach courses that prepare students for practice, and generate pressure for curricular changes that would move law schools further from law practice. That pressure conflicts with increasing demands from educational experts, students, the organized bar, and potential employers of law graduates that law schools place greater emphasis on preparing students for practice. Whether the shift to disciplinary legal empiricism actually reduces the faculty's aggregate knowledge of legal practice depends ultimately on what disciplinary legal empiricists study and how they study it. That is why the nature of disciplinary legal empiricism matters.
A. Ph.D. Hiring
Law school hiring of Ph.D.s as tenure-track faculty members has increased dramatically in recent years. For example, in 2014 and 2015, twothirds of the entry-level tenure-track hires at top twenty-six law schools were 23 40 Furthermore, the data suggests a declining trend in the mean level of practice experience.
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B. Preparation of Students for Practice
While law faculties are apparently withdrawing from engagement with practice and embracing the traditional academic disciplines of the university through Ph.D. hiring, a succession of experts on legal education has been recommending that the law schools move in the opposite direction. The 1979 Report of the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Competency recommended:
(a) developing some of the fundamental skills underemphasized by traditional legal education; (b) shaping attitudes, values, and work habits critical to the individual's ability to translate knowledge and relevant skills into adequate professional performance; and (c) providing integrated learning experiences focused on particular fields of lawyer practice, including but not limited to trial practice.
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The 1992 Report of the ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession-commonly known as the "MacCrate Report"-recommended that law schools should not just prepare students "for admission to the bar" but should "prepare them to participate effectively in the legal profession." and inadequate concern with professional responsibility." 45 The Report elaborated:
Most law schools give only casual attention to teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity of actual law practice. Unlike other professional education, most notably medical school, legal education typically pays relatively little attention to direct training in professional practice. The result is to prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather than an apprentice practitioner, conveying the impression that lawyers are more like competitive scholars than attorneys engaged with the problems of clients.
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Those reports and ensuing commentary culminated in the ABA's adoption of a law school accreditation requirement that "each student . . . satisfactorily complete at least . . . one or more experiential course(s) totaling at least six credit hours. An experiential course must be a simulation course, a law clinic, or a field placement."
47 The ABA will apply this new standard beginning in 2016-2017 "as appropriate, to students who become 1L students in that year."
48 Law schools are now scrambling to fund and staff the new courses. Standard 303. CURRICULUM (a) A law school shall offer a curriculum that requires each student to satisfactorily complete at least the following: . . . (3) one or more experiential course(s) totaling at least six credit hours. An experiential course must be a simulation course, a law clinic, or a field placement. To satisfy this requirement, a course must be primarily experiential in nature and must: (i) integrate doctrine, theory, skills, and legal ethics, and engage students in performance of one or more of the professional skills identified in Standard 302; (ii) develop the concepts underlying the professional skills being taught; (iii) provide multiple opportunities for performance; and (iv) provide opportunities for self-evaluation.
Id.
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C. The Conflict
Legal scholarship is expensive. Former Dean Edward Rubin estimates the cost at forty to fifty percent of the faculty budget. 49 The faculty budget is by far the largest expense in a law school budget. 50 The standard justifications for incurring the cost of legal scholarship and passing the bulk of it along to students in the form of tuition are that legal scholarship enhances the law school's reputation, updates faculty knowledge, and generates new ideas.
Once hired, tenure-track faculty, unlike their non-tenure-track peers, decide their own scholarly agendas. Those agendas are expected to, and do, drive changes in the law schools' curricula. 51 As Rubin put it:
[I]f we want to eliminate the divergence between scholarship and teaching, what should change is not the scholarship but the curriculum. The scholarship is up-to-date with both the current practice of law, in its broadest sense, and with the current theories about what law is, and what it does, in our society. The curriculum has been obsolete, on both these fronts, for close to one hundred years. Of course, change for change's sake is not necessarily a good thing, but when both the subject matter and the underlying theory of the subject matter change as rapidly and comprehensively as law has, one must naturally conclude that the law professors have the right idea in their role as scholars, not as teachers.
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As my study of disciplinary legal empiricism shows, faculty research agendas-and the curricular changes that would logically flow from themconflict with the curricular changes being required by the educational experts and accreditors. The former ignore practice while the latter embrace it. Because the schools are implementing both kinds of changes, the two compete for student enrollments. My impression is that the changes focused on practice are attracting more students.
The law schools can resolve this conflict in essentially three ways. One possibility is for the law schools to hire lower proportions of Ph.D.s to the tenure-track faculty. I have already explained why I consider that unlikely.
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A second possibility is that law schools could continue hiring large proportions of Ph.D.s to the tenure-track faculty, while hiring smaller numbers of them. The schools would use the freed-up resources to hire more full-time, non-tenure-track faculty to meet the demand for practice preparation. Although I consider this second resolution the most likely, it suffers from at least three serious disadvantages. First, dividing the courses between theoretical and practical faculty will prevent the integration of the two kinds of knowledge. Second, the division will largely sever the link between scholarship and teaching. The tenure-track faculty will do most of the scholarship and the non-tenure-track faculty will do most of the teaching. Professors' teaching will be less likely to benefit from their scholarship. Third, the law schools will create a large, permanent, full-time under-faculty. The social dynamics of such a change are difficult to predict, but one likely effect is that the political power of the tenured faculty will shrink with its size.
The third possibility is that disciplinary legal empiricists will bridge the gap between their disciplines and legal practice. They would do that by acquiring sufficient knowledge through their research to participate effectively in preparing students for legal practice. For example, the researchers might interview practitioners about what they do and how they do it. In addition to statistically analyzing court opinions, statutes, transcripts, or other legal documents, they might also read and analyze them. Through such efforts, disciplinary legal empiricists might gain essentially the same kind of knowledge that would have come from practicing law. But, the empirical study of disciplinary legal empiricism that I report in Parts II and III suggests that is not in fact the nature of disciplinary legal empiricism.
II. METHODOLOGY
I personally collected the data used in this study by examining the full text of 120 journal articles. Each of the journal articles I studied presented the results of an empirical study. Sixty of the articles were published in JELS and the other sixty were published in the "first" or "main" student-edited law reviews at U.S. law schools ranked in the top fifty by U.S. News and World Report in 2011. 54 The JELS articles are the universe of empirical studies published in JELS over the two-year period beginning with Issue 3 of Volume 6 and ending with Issue 2 of Volume 8 (the "JELS universe"). The time period covered is essentially the last six months of 2009 through the first six months of 2011. I excluded a few articles because they discussed other empirical studies without reporting new empirical research.
The law review articles are a random sample drawn from the UCLA School of Law Empirical Research Group bibliographic database ("UCLA database"). These are the protocols for article inclusion:
The following rubrics were used to identify "empirical" research. research, or (2) the inclusion of tables or charts from other publications (i.e., the Census) with more than a cursory interpretation of the data. The rule of thumb for (2) is whether another scholar would cite the article or the original source to support the proposition supported by the data. The third (3) rubric is whether the article contains a detailed description of the research methodology. This could include protocols for quantitative research (data collection) or qualitative research (interviews). If any one of these was met with satisfaction, the article was included in the database. As our aim is to be over-rather than under-inclusive, we also searched Westlaw for review articles with "empirical" in the title, and subjected them to the same protocols.
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Although this definition would support the inclusion of qualitative empiricism that did not include tabulation, none appeared in the sample. The UCLA database contained 1,664 articles, comments, notes, and essays 56 published in a wide variety of journals. I first removed those not published in a top-fifty law review, and then those not published during the period from the last six months of 2009 through the first six months of 2011.
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After those removals, 154 articles remained. I used Microsoft Excel's random number function to rank the articles for inclusion in the study. I then coded the sixty articles with the lowest ranks after applying this filter: The article had to present an empirical study, as distinguished from merely discussing an empirical study previously presented. The empirical study could be based on preexisting data but, at a minimum, had to analyze the preexisting data in a different manner. I did not consider simulations to be empirical studies.
Several 56. I included student notes and comments because JELS also published some student work. Of the sixty articles in the law review sample, four (amounting to seven percent) were student notes or comments.
57. As with the JELS universe, I used the cover date of the issue in which the article was published to determine the date of publication. In many instances, the cover date did not include a publication month. I resolved those instances by assuming that journals published half their issues for a year in the first half of the year and half in the last half of the year. If a journal volume spanned two years (for example, 2010-2011), and the cover data did not disclose a month of publication, I assumed that the first half of the issues were published in 2010, and the last half were published in 2011. I sought to determine whether researchers coded their main datasets. The process was somewhat subjective for two reasons. First, many of the JELS and law review authors did not disclose clearly how their data came to be coded. I exercised judgment in interpreting ambiguous statements and, in a few cases, relied on my knowledge of how such data would likely have come to be coded. Second, when researchers used several datasets from different sources, I sometimes had difficulty in classifying one as the "main" dataset. If it was not clear which dataset was the "main" dataset, I considered the dataset coded by the researcher to be the main one and classified the article as "coded some." Unless otherwise indicated, references to "coded" include "coded some." In nearly all instances, I coded blind. That is, I coded not knowing whether the authors held Ph.D.s.
My data source categorizations are of the immediate, not the ultimate, sources of the data. For example, if researchers obtained court opinions from the courts, I categorized the source as "government." If researchers obtained the same court opinions from Lexis or Westlaw, I categorized the source as "publisher." If researchers obtained a dataset in which other researchers had categorized the same opinions or used datasets they themselves coded for prior studies, I categorized the source as "researcher." In all three instances, I recorded the fact that the source was a court opinion in the "coded from" field.
The difference between a publisher and a researcher is that a publisher charges money for the data while a researcher does not. Data from Standard & Poor's Compustat database is from a publisher. The same data from a source that did not charge for it would be from a researcher. If data were obtained directly from the government, I categorized the source as "government," whether or not the government charged money for the data.
Following Ginsburg and Miles, 58 my initial study design treated studies published in JELS as representative of disciplinary legal empiricism and studies published in the law reviews as representative of nondisciplinary legal empiricism. 59 The data I collected, however, showed that the most important 58 . See Ginsburg & Miles, supra note 17, at 1797 (treating studies published in the Journal of Legal Studies and the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization as representative of empirical disciplinary work and articles published in the "top 15" law reviews as representative of "major law review articles"); id. at 1823-24 ("We have also demonstrated that empirical and interdisciplinary work, with their increasingly sophisticated methodologies, are driving much of the coauthorship trend.").
59. Operationally, I have defined nondisciplinary legal empiricism as legal empiricism done by persons holding J.D. but not Ph.D. degrees. differences turned on the mix of degrees held by the studies' authors. I have focused on that mix in reporting my findings in this Article.
III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. Collaboration "Collaboration," as used here, means scholars working jointly on research. Collaboration within a field or discipline is generally measured either by the proportion of coauthored articles or by the average number of authors per article.
60 I used both measures. The argument for law schools to hire Ph.D.s as collaborators is twopronged. The first prong is that collaboration has a generally positive effect on the quantity and quality of research. 61 Research has shown that jointly authored articles are slightly more likely to survive peer review than singleauthor articles 62 and that collaboration may be associated with higher productivity. 63 One theoretical basis for this positive view of collaboration is that collaborators can bring a wider array of skills and knowledge to bear on a problem.
The case for collaboration is, however, unclear. Evidence exists that collaboration has no effect, or even negative effects, on research. First, it appears that collaboration is less likely than sole authorship to produce highly When publishing productivity is measured by 'normal count' (a scientist's total number of publications), collaboration is a strong predictor of publishing productivity. When publishing productivity is measured by 'fractional count' (dividing credit by the number of coauthors), collaboration and publishing productivity are not significantly related, at least not in a model controlling for moderating variables. Id. at 693. [VOL. 76:449 influential research. 64 Second, studies that associate collaboration with productivity often credit each coauthor with the article, thus arguably doubleor triple-counting articles produced through collaboration. Absent this double-or triple-counting, collaboration may not be correlated with the overall levels of scholars' productivity. 65 The second prong of the collaboration argument for law school Ph.D. hiring is that it will produce a specific type of collaboration-one in which J.D.-only professors with subject matter expertise are able to collaborate with Ph.D.s, or with J.D.-Ph.D.s with statistical or empirical expertise, to enable J.D.-only professors to participate in empirical research, and ultimately become empiricists.
In the remainder of this Section, I argue first that there is a modest, longterm, upward trend in collaboration in the field of law. Second, increases in empiricism, peer-reviewed publications, and Ph.D.-hiring are all potential explanations because all are associated with higher collaboration rates. But because the modest increases in collaboration are largely increases in collaboration among Ph.D.s, not between Ph.D.s and J.D.-only professors, the data provide only weak support for the second prong of the rationale for hiring Ph.D.s.
Trends in Collaboration
Rates of collaboration have differed dramatically by discipline over time. For example, George and Guthrie report collaboration rates for history, philosophy, and modern languages that never exceeded 10% for any of the five-year periods from 1970 through 1999.
66 By contrast, the five-year-period rates they report for social psychology increased from 65% for the period 1970-1974 to 89% for the period 1995-1999. 67 For sociology the increase was from 40% to 60%; for economics it was from 31% to 65%; and for political science it was from 22% to 45%. 68 In all likelihood, the run-up in these George and Guthrie report "no trend at all" in collaboration in the law reviews in the period between 1970 and 1999.
70 Instead, they report "an average annual rate of 15 percent in elite as well as non-elite journals."
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That a trend in collaboration among authors of law review articles exists over a longer time period is, however, highly likely. First, Ginsburg and Miles found an "upward trend in coauthorship" in top-fifteen law reviews from 2000 to 2010.
72 Second, two informal studies covering periods prior and subsequent to the period covered by George and Guthrie's study suggest an overall increase in collaboration. In the earlier study, Saks informally reported a 7% collaboration rate for 1960. 73 In the later study, I report here that 27 of 120 randomly selected law review articles published in elite law reviews in 2010 (23%) had more than one author. 74 Ginsburg and Miles reported a coauthorship rate in top-fifteen law reviews during the period 2000 through 2010 (20.1%) that is consistent with the rate I report (23%).
75 Table 1 shows that the difference in the collaboration rate reported by George and Guthrie and the rate I found is statistically significant (p = .039). The most likely explanation for George and Guthrie's negative finding regarding the trend in collaboration is that a long-term upward trend existed, but was so moderate during the period they studied that they could not detect it. 76 69. Moody, supra note 60, at 218 (providing data in Figure 1 on s report) ; id. at 326 n.8 (describing Saks's paper and letter). Unfortunately, Saks did not publish and Schuck does not report the numbers of articles Saks studied. As a result, it is not possible to calculate whether Saks's data were statistically significantly different than George and Guthrie's.
74. The Law Review Collaboration Study was an informal study in which I randomized the sample by choosing articles from the journals in my law review sample, proceeding through the journals alphabetically, choosing the first issue published by a given journal with a 2010 date, continuing with a single journal for not more articles than were included in my law review sample, and continuing with the journal list until I reached 120 articles. George & Guthrie data are for elite and non-elite law reviews, supra note 64, at 561-62. LoPucki data are for top-fifty law reviews. Error in percentage due to rounding Chi-square, p = .039.
I conclude that an upward trend in collaboration exists in law, but that it is less pronounced than the corresponding trends in other fields. As the next Section shows, this modest upward trend is probably the result of an increase in empirical articles.
Empiricism
Ginsburg and Miles recently found that "empirical articles are far more likely [than non-empirical articles] to be coauthored." 77 In his study of collaboration in the field of sociology, Moody found that the "specialty areas differ in the likelihood of collaboration, and much (but not all) of this difference is due to use of quantitative methods." 78 As shown in Table 2 , I found that the rate of collaboration in empirical law review articles (45%) is almost double the rate of collaboration in all law review articles (23%). The difference is statistically significant (p=.002). 77 . Ginsburg & Miles, supra note 17, at 1807 ("The rate of empiricism among coauthored articles is 21.6% in contrast to 9.4% among all major articles.").
78. Moody, supra note 60, at 214.
All law review articles are from the Law Review Collaboration study, supra note 74. Empirical articles probably were included in the all law review sample. Error in percentage total due to rounding. The difference between all law review articles and all legal empirical articles is statistically significant. Chi-square, p = .002.
Together, these studies demonstrate that empiricism can be a principal driver of collaboration. The size of the differences in the rates of collaboration in all law review articles, as compared with empirical law review articles, suggests, but does not prove, that the shift to empiricism is causing the modest increase in law review collaboration.
The mechanism by which empiricism increases collaboration remains to be identified. But, based on my three decades of experience as an empiricist, I speculate that collaboration increases with the sophistication of the methodology. When projects become so complex that it is no longer practical to get useful feedback from non-authors, authors must take on coauthors. [VOL. 76:449
Peer Review
I compared the rate of collaboration in empirical articles published in non-peer-reviewed law reviews with the rate of collaboration in empirical articles published in JELS, a peer-reviewed law journal. Table 3 shows the results. Twenty-seven of the sixty empirical law review articles (45%) were coauthored, as compared with forty-five of the sixty empirical JELS articles (75%). The difference is statistically significant (p = .001). The rate of collaboration is higher in JELS than in empirical law review articles.
The results are similar when the number of authors on an article, rather than just the presence of a second author, is used as the basis for comparison. The average number of authors on the JELS articles, 2.2, is significantly larger than 1.6, the corresponding average for empirical law review articles (p = .006).
My findings are analogous to those in a study by Ginsburg and Miles.
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They compared the rate of collaboration in articles published in non-peerreviewed, top law reviews with the rate of collaboration in articles published in the peer- The collaboration percentage for LoPucki law reviews is from note 74, supra. Table 4 compares the findings of those two studies with the law review findings from my informal law review study 85 and the finding from my formal JELS study. Together, the findings appear to be consistent with the theory that quantitative empiricism-which is, essentially, statistics-rather than peer review, drives collaboration. That is, coauthorship rates are highest in JELS, where the empiricism is highly quantitative, next highest in JLS and JLEO, which are less quantitative than JELS, next highest in the Law and Society Review, which is less quantitative than JLS and JLEO, and lowest in the law reviews, which are the least quantitative. To put it another way, the ranking of these journals by the proportions of quantitative empiricism they publish, as shown in Table 4 , appears to match the ranking of these journals by their proportions of coauthorship. The more quantitative the journal, the higher the collaboration rate.
Ph.D. Tendency to Collaborate
Whether an article has at least one Ph.D. author is a significant predictor of the number of authors. That is, the number of authors tends to be higher if a Ph.D. is among the authors. Model (3) shows that the combination of peer review and whether the author has a Ph.D. explains sixteen percent of the article-to-article variation in the number of authors. Both the nature of the journal and the nature of the authors contribute significantly to the prediction. Ph.D.s collaborate more than J.D.-only professors, even controlling for the type of journal in which they publish.
Based on Table 5 , one might expect that hiring more Ph.D.s and converting the law reviews to peer review would be effective ways to increase collaboration between J.D.-Ph.D.s and J.D.s on law faculties. But, as is explained in the next Section, Ph.D. collaboration is disproportionately collaboration with other Ph.Ds.
J.D.-Ph.D. with J.D. Collaboration
In recent years, the hiring of J. The results are similar when articles are the unit of analysis. Table 7 shows that for 86 of the 119 empirical articles for which data were available (72%), no author was a J. In summary, collaboration may or may not produce more or better scholarship. Collaboration increases with empiricism, particularly with quantitative empiricism, and perhaps particularly with methodologically sophisticated empiricism. But that collaboration is largely between disciplinary empiricists, not between disciplinary and non-disciplinary empiricists. Hiring small numbers of disciplinary legal empiricists does not seem to generate large numbers of non-disciplinary empiricists.
B. Journal Type
This study began as an effort to compare the types of legal empiricism published in leading law reviews with the types published in a leading peer review journal. I found a strong correlation between Ph.D. authorship and peer-reviewed publications.
Degree Type and Journal Type Correlation
Ph.D. authorship is strongly correlated with publication in peer-reviewed journals. The correlation may result from JELS's preference to published Ph.D.-authored scholarship or from Ph.D.s' preference to be published in peer-reviewed journals, but it is so strong that it likely results from both. The correlation is not as strong for J.D.-Ph.D.s, but is still positive. The correlation is strongly negative for J.D.-only authors.
As shown in Table 8 , J.D.-only professors were 73% of top twenty-six law school tenure-track faculty members, 60% of top law review empirical article authors, and only 28% of JELS authors. If JELS is an accurate proxy for peer review legal empiricism, peer review legal empiricism has little room for J.D.-only professors. The difference in the proportions of authors with Ph.D.-degrees between JELS and the law reviews was similarly dramatic when articles rather than authors are the unit of analysis. As shown in Table 9 , at least one author had a Ph.D. degree, or was a Ph.D. candidate, for fifty-one of the sixty JELS articles studied (85%). The corresponding ratio for empirical law review articles was twenty-seven of sixty (55%).
If Chi-square, p < .0001 Table 10 shows that the authors of fifty-six of the sixty law review articles studied (93%) included at least one author who held a law degree or was a candidate for a law degree. That is hardly surprising. One would expect law degrees among authors publishing in law reviews. What is surprising is that for 35% of the articles published in JELS, no author held a law degree or was even a candidate for a law degree. This difference between JELS and the law reviews is statistically significant (p < .001). A comparison of Table  9 with Table 10 reveals that, to publish an article in JELS, having a Ph.D. (85%) may be more important than having a law degree (65%). 
Implications for Student-Edited Journals
Ph.D.s' preference for publication in peer-reviewed journals has important implications for student-edited law reviews. "Peer reviewed," when used with respect to law reviews, can have several meanings. At minimum, it means that faculty members read at least some of the submissions and commented on them before the student editors accepted them for publication. By that definition, a large proportion of "student-edited" law reviews are peer reviewed because student editors seek the advice of faculty members before making their decisions.
Peer-reviewed, as I use the term here, means that faculty members decide which submissions should be published. Even by that definition, a substantial number of law school journals are peer-reviewed. They include JELS, the Journal of Legal Studies, the American Journal of Comparative Law, the Supreme Court Review, and many others. But, it appears that students make the publication decisions at every law school's most prestigious journal (hereafter the "first journals"). The Journal's Editorial Board selects articles for publication in the peer review forum based on the recommendations of faculty peer reviewers-members of a Peer Review science, or experimental psychology. For law students to develop that expertise in law school is impractical. Third, once most law professors hold Ph.D.s, the first law reviews at top law schools will have to compete not only with other law reviews, but also with the highly prestigious, In part, economics Ph.D. programs are oriented toward placing their top students in economics departments or in other fields that have peer review as their main publication outlet. Because law schools traditionally have given great weight to nonpeer-reviewed, student-edited law reviews, economics departments would have the justifiable concern that their graduates who are law faculty will not continue to publish in peer-reviewed economics journals and would not contribute to the frontiers of economic research or the ranking of an economics department.
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If the trend in Ph.D. hiring continues, law schools will have no choice. They will have to convert their first journals to peer review.
C. Data Source Types
The types of skills scholars acquire play a larger part in determining the types of scholarship they will produce. As Balkin wrote, the disciplines largely determine those types:
Disciplines provide their members with tools of understanding. By providing people with some tools rather than others and by enhancing some skills at the expense of others, disciplines necessarily push their members toward asking the kinds of questions with which these tools are best equipped to deal and treating all other questions as variants of these. learn to use the Supreme Court Database. 97 The data sources on which a discipline relies are important because members learn those data sources as part of their disciplinary training. Mastering new data sources can require substantial investments of time, so scholars tend to stick with the ones they know.
Data from the instant study showed substantial differences between disciplinary and non-disciplinary empiricism in the types of data sources used. The authors drew their data from six types of data sources: (1) government, (2) non-governmental organizations, (3) publishers, (4) researchers, (5) surveys, and (6) experiments. Table 11 shows that two sources dominated: government (35%) and private publishers (23%).
As Table 11 To explore the significance of the non-Ph.D.s' greater use of publisher data, I determined the correlation between use of publisher data and the ranks of the journals in which articles were published. Within the law reviews category, I ranked law reviews (excluding JELS) based on the U.S. News and World Report academic ranking of law schools, which was in turn based on that publication's annual survey of law professors.
98 I found that the use of data from a published source was a negative indicator of prestige (p = .079).
99
The higher the rank of the law school publishing the law review, the lower the probability that the law review published a study based on publisher data. I conclude that empirical research based on publisher data has less appeal to law reviews than other kinds of empirical research. The reduced appeal may be either because of its genre or because of the quality of the research and reporting.
Although my sample is not large enough and my data-source categories are not sufficiently refined to fully capture the nature of the differences in 98 
D. Survey and Experiment
To explore the differences in the study methods and data types used by Ph.D.s and J.D.-only professors, I coded the study methods into four mutually exclusive categories: (1) analyzing preexisting data, (2) analyzing data coded by the authors, (3) survey, and (4) experiment. My primary purpose was to compare the first two categories, but to achieve this it was first necessary to distinguish the first two categories from the latter two.
Researchers may code survey and experimental responses. The difference between the coded-by-the-authors category and the survey and experiment categories is that in the former, the researchers coded information about the legal system, while in the latter two, the researchers coded nonlegal information that they generate themselves, or they did not code anything at all. Coding legal information typically requires legal analysis and so involves the researcher with law; coding self-generated nonlegal information does not involve the researcher with law.
Survey research is similar to experimental research in that researchers of both kinds study the responses of human subjects. The two differ in that experimental researchers manipulate the subjects' conditions before they elicit responses; survey researchers just elicit responses.
Ph.D. authors were more likely than non-Ph.D. authors to publish experiments (as distinguished from all other kinds of studies), although this relationship is only marginally statistically significant. The p-value is .084 if Ph.D. status is measured by the presence of at least one Ph.D.-holding author; it is .099 if Ph.D. status is measured by the proportion of Ph.D.-holding authors.
The designs of nearly half of the experimental and survey studies published in JELS did not appear to require any legal knowledge and addressed research questions that were more typical of non-law disciplines than of law disciplines. Examples include: an experiment regarding the effect of the ability to punish on group cooperation, 100 an experiment regarding the effect of adversary advice on the ability to solve math problems, 101 103 and an experiment regarding the effect of the cost of communication on reaching group consensus. 104 All fifteen of the experimental or survey studies published in JELS had at least one Ph.D. author. This pattern is consistent with the more general observation that members of a discipline, when pursuing "interdisciplinary" research, tend to address the research questions of their home disciplines. 105 Law reviews and JELS were about equally likely to publish the category of research that includes both survey and experimental studies. Fifteen of sixty law review studies (25%) were survey or experimental; fourteen of sixty JELS studies (23%) were survey or experimental. But of the fourteen studies published in law reviews, ten (71%) were survey and only four (29%) were experimental, while of the fifteen studies published in JELS, only five (33%) were survey and ten (67%) were experimental. This difference in proportions was statistically significant (p = .040). Law reviews tend to publish surveys, while JELS tends to publish experiments. This difference is more closely associated with journal type than with the participation of Ph.D.s in the studies. 106 The technical nature of experimental methods seems to be the most likely explanation for the correlation between experiment and JELS publication. Readers tend to be skeptical of complex methods; peer review confers credibility on those methods. Another possibility is that JELS has greater tolerance for studies less directly related to law.
E. Author Coding
Empirical research is research based on observation or experience. Coding is the process by which the person who observes or experiences generates data for quantitative analysis. The process requires that the researcher create and define categories of observations and characteristics of those observations. For traditional methods of statistical analysis, the data must be reduced to the form of a two-dimensional numeric matrix.
Quantitative analysis-essentially statistics-is the process by which the researcher summarizes the data, generalizes about it, or makes aspects of it visible. Quantitative analysis is frequently referred to as "empiricism," but it is not a process of observation or experience.
My definition of empiricism for this study included both coding followed by quantitative analysis and quantitative analysis alone. I categorized studies as "coded" if the authors coded some or all of their main data and "preexisting" if the authors merely analyzed a preexisting dataset. The latter category includes studies in which the authors statistically analyzed a dataset they themselves coded for an earlier study.
I found that Ph.D. authors were less likely than non-Ph.D. authors to code their main data sources. The finding held true whether I defined Ph.D. authorship as the article having at least one Ph.D. author (p < .001) or as the proportion of Ph.D. authors (p = .004). Table 12 shows that 82% of nonPh.D. authors (thirty-seven of forty-five) coded their main data, as compared with 42% of authors that included at least one Ph.D. holder (nineteen of fortyfive). Ph.D. authors are about half as likely to code their main data. Law review authors were 65% more likely than JELS authors to code their main data. That is, law review authors coded their main data source in twenty-eight of forty-five studies (62%); JELS authors coded their main data source in only seventeen of forty-five studies (38%). The difference is statistically significant (p=.020). Suchman and Mertz discovered a similar difference in comparing JELS authors with Law & Society Review authors. 107 But, as 
Variables
(1) Coded Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
As shown in Table 14 , of authors who coded, 108 forty-two percent coded judicial opinions. Eighteen percent coded documents filed with courts, and another eighteen percent coded other legal documents, such as contracts or securities law filings.
Ph.D.s who coded differed from J.D.-only professors who coded in the types of data sources they coded (p = .027). Ph.D.s were less likely to code judicial opinions than to code other types of material (p = .065) 109 and significantly more likely to code non-legal materials than to code legal materials (p = .031).
110 Ph.D.s and J.D.-only professors were about equally likely to code documents filed with courts and other legal documents, but the sample sizes were small. pattern of authorship in JELS-a leading peer-reviewed journal-shows that, at least in that particular instance, the peer review process values methodological expertise more than legal expertise. 112 Third, disciplinary legal empiricists were more likely to draw their data from non-legal sources, prior research, surveys, or experiments, while non-disciplinary legal empiricists were more likely to draw their data from legal sources. 113 Lastly, disciplinary legal empiricists were only half as likely as non-disciplinary legal empiricists to create the data sets they analyzed. 114 These findings show that disciplinary legal empiricists are not engaging with lawyers or legal materials to the degree that non-disciplinary legal empiricists are. The disciplinary legal empiricists increasingly arrive in law schools with little or no familiarity with legal practice and then pursue scholarly agendas that do little to compensate for that lack of experience. 115 The disciplinary legal empiricists' resulting lack of familiarity with the work of lawyers limits their ability to prepare students to work as lawyers.
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Law faculties have benefitted tremendously from the presence of disciplinary legal scholars, including disciplinary legal empiricists. Disciplinary legal scholarship introduced new ideas and spawned a wave of interdisciplinary work that advanced scholarship in virtually every field of law. Faculties have assumed that hiring increasingly larger numbers of disciplinary scholars would accelerate these advances. As a result, those faculties are pursuing hiring strategies that, if continued, would surrender control of legal scholarship to the disciplinary scholars' home disciplines. 117 In this Article, I have argued that Ph.D. hiring, measured as a proportion of tenure-track hiring, will continue to accelerate. But it will not go unchecked. Educational experts, the legal profession, and students are demanding that the law schools offer a program of study that prepares students for legal practice. If the tenure-track faculty lacks the knowledge and experience to teach that program, the law schools will hire non-tenure-track, full-time faculty to do so. The size of the tenure-track law faculty will shrink, and that faculty will lose its historical influence. 117. I conclude that surrender would be to the discipline rather than the law faculty, because I assume that a peer-reviewed journal that published articles in several disciplines would send an article in a particular discipline to other members of that same discipline for review. Review of an article in political science by a psychologist would not be by a "peer."
